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a<pa{pri 5ri\)T£ p.e nop(pvpf\
(3dX.Xcov xpuc^0K6^lTl(; "Epax;
vrivi jioiKiX-oaapiPd^q)
a\)|ina{^eiv npoKaXeixai-
i] 6', eaxlv ydp an' eTJKxiTO-u
Aeapot), TTiv |iev z[it\v koiitiv,
XeuKTi ydp, Kataneficpexai,
Ttpoi; 6' aXkT\v xivd xdoKei. ^
In the 1993 volume of this journal Robert Renehan devoted an article to
rebutting comments that I had made about an earlier article of his on
Anacreon 13.' A particular complaint is that I misrepresented him in
various ways. Some of these imputations are of no general interest, so I will
address them here only in notes, if at all; the major charge of
misrepresentation, however, raises some questions, significant for the
interpretation of the poem, about types of ambiguity—by universal
agreement a treacherous subject. In dealing with it, even so superficially as
we will here, we travel over a spectrum encompassing trick oracles and the
like, where the existence and "solution" of the hermeneutic problem are
often clarified within the text itself, to ambiguities or potential ambiguities
that are not overtly acknowledged in the texts thought to contain them, and
thus remain forever obscure and disputable, if to varying degrees. As the
definition and boundaries of such ambiguities tend to be both permeable and
expansive, we have to take into account the possibility of their extending to
include an interpreter's ambivalences about ambiguities that he or she
entertains and discusses as possible.
The quickest way to frame the issue as it is touched by Renehan' s and
my discussions of Anacreon 13 is to quote Renehan's recent criticism of
me, and then compare to it the conclusion of his earlier article:
I wish to thank the editor and /C5's anonymous referees for helpful criticisms and
suggestions.
' R. Renehan, "On the Interpretation of a Poem of Anacreon," ICS 18 (1993) 39^7,
henceforth Renehan (1993). The earlier article (henceforth Renehan [1984]) is "Anacreon
Fragment 13 Page," CP 79 (1984) 28-32. My article (henceforth Pelliccia [1991]) is
"Anacreon 13 (358 PMG)," CP 86 (1991) 30-36.
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On page 31, in the course of analyzing the structure of verses 5-8, 1 stated
in part: "When one then proceeds to npbc, S(e) aXkx\\/ xivd (no further), it
is all but unavoidable to supply mentally a corresponding KOiiriv."
Ignoring the crucial qualification "no further," Pelliccia misrepresents me
as arguing that "koio-TIv . . . must be supplied with npbc, 5' aA.A,Tiv Tivd."
My actual point was that, when one then goes on to the last word of the
poem, one meets an unexpected verb which makes it quite likely that
aA,A.r|v xivd does not after all refer to koixtiv, but rather to another
woman. . . I thought that I had made it clear in my CP paper that I
preferred [this] interpretation, if an absolute choice had to be made (see
below). Perhaps not.^
Now the final paragraphs of the earlier article:
There are two possibilities; they depend upon the meaning of eaxlv
ydp an e\)KT{T0\) Aeapox) in lines 5-6. (1) If that statement is taken at
face value as a complimentary allusion to the girl's origins, then ko^tiv is
to be understood with dA,A,riv in line 6, and Anacreon's revenge consists
solely in the use of an unflattering expression (xdoKeiv npoc,) to describe
her misdirected attentions (as he sees it). The poem is heterosexual on this
reading;^ the sense is acceptable. (2) If the statement that the girl is from
Lesbos intimates that she is a lesbian—and that would not become
apparent (deliberately so) until the final verse—then d>.>.riv refers to a
woman and the rcapot 7tpoa5oK{av is even more pronounced. If this
interpretation is correct, AeaPov) and dXXr|v are each intentionally
ambiguous: one should not then insist, with most scholars, that aXXriv
must refer either to "hair" or to "a girl" to the exclusion of the other. It
may refer, at different levels, to both. In support of this reading of the
poem is the fact that, if such were not Anacreon's intention, it would be a
remarkable coincidence that both AeaPox) and dA,X,Tiv admit of such
pointed ambiguity.
Nevertheless, when all is said and done, we shall never be quite sure
of Anacreon's meaning, for we are no longer in a position to know with
certitude which of the two interpretations of eoxlv ydp an eixxixov
^ Renehan (1993) 40 f. Cf. S. T. Mace, "Amour, Encore! The Development of 8^m^ in
Archaic Lyric," GRBS 34 (1993) 335-64, at 348 n. 45: "[Renehan (1993)] discusses the issues
well, but disappoints in failing to endorse either 'a girl' or 'hair' and suggesting some
intentional ambiguity on the part of the poet."
'
"The poem is heterosexual": sic. It is interesting that Renehan assumes that the only
alternative to the lesbian-mocking interpretation of the poem is one in which the girl is
heterosexual. But there is no reason why his interpretation (1) need touch the girl's sexual
orientation at all; all interpretation (1) requires is the absence from the poem of a slur against
female homosexuality. In this connection some readers might find piquing the observation
made to me by Michelle Kwintner that nothing in the text precludes the possibility that the
speaker is a woman. Before dismissing this suggestion out of hand, we must think of Alcman's
poems written for female performers which include expressions of passion for other females
(cf. Anacreon 40, Alcaeus lOB, and Theognis 257-60). Kwintner's suggestion would turn
Renehan' s conclusion ("one or the other of these two interpretations of the poem must be
correct") upside down: eoTiv yap an euktItou AeoPox) would be "taken at face value as a
complimentary allusion to the girl's origins" and aXkr]v would "refer to a woman" and there
would be no Ttapa 7ipoo5oKiav joke involving female homosexuality.
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AeaPov is correct. And if such a conclusion [emphasis added] appear
unsatisfactory to some, I can but refer them to Grotius: "nescire quaedam
magna pars sapientiae est." To end on a more positive note, it seems to
me perfectly safe to assert that one or the other of these two interpretations
of the poem must be correct. There is no tertium quid; all other proposals
are to be rejected."*
It is clear that there is an inconsistency: Here in the earlier article
Renehan speaks of two interpretations between which he says it is
impossible on present knowledge to choose; in the more recent article,
quoted first, he says he preferred one of the two all along. ^ Although I
hesitate to suggest it, the possibility seems real (especially in the absence of
alternatives) that Renehan has identified the expression of irresolvable
ambivalence with which he concludes his first article (exemplifying what
we can call "scholar's ambiguity") with the ambiguity which, immediately
before in his possibility (2), he had ascribed to the meaning of a?i^r|v xiva
(which would be an example of poet's ambiguity). It is perfectly clear, of
course, that poetic ambiguity is not the same thing as the judicial or
scholarly non liquet: To state that "this poem is ambiguous" is to take an
unambiguous position; to state as your conclusion that "we shall never be
quite sure of Anacreon's meaning . . . [but] one or the other of these two
interpretations of the poem must be correct" is to take an ambiguous
position about the "correct" interpretation of a poem.
These points may or may not be relevant; it seems worth making them
just in case they are. We can proceed now to the question of the existence
and nature of poetic ambiguity in Anacreon 13 itself.
In the new article Renehan reformulates his (now espoused)
interpretation (2) as follows:
As one goes through the sentence, eaxlv yap dn' euktItox) Aeapou is first
understood to refer to the girl's illustrious homeland. (The epithet
euKxiTou, because of its usual associations . . . , may itself be deceptive.)
Then, especially because of the emphatic "centerpiece" of the sentence,
Tf|v [lev e^fiv k6|itiv, one instinctively supplies K6(iriv with the contrasting
TCpoc;M oXkr\v xivd
—
until one sees the unflattering verb xdcJKei, at which
point one realizes that eaxiv ydp art' eiJKTUo-u AeaPou can admit of a
quite different (lesbian) meaning and that k6|J.T|v need not be supplied,
thereby making ak'kr\v xivd refer to a person.^
"Renehan (1984) 32.
^ With regard to the specific issue on which Renehan claims (in the passage from his second
article quoted first) that I misrepresented him, it is evident that, in the final restatement of
interpretation (1) in his first article (as quoted above), Renehan himself did not include "the
crucial qualification 'no further"' (i.e. "no further" than nphc, 5' ak'kr\v Tivd): The
"heterosexual" interpretation which understands Kojiriv with aXkr\\ xivd (and whose "sense is
acceptable" when that is done) is actually formulated by him to include the words (xdoKeiv
Tipoq), which the "crucial qualification" was allegedly designed to exclude.
^ Renehan (1993) 46; emphasis in the original.
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This passage raises two separate issues that I want to address; the first is
whether the interpretation works on its own terms; the second is whether
espousing it (as Renehan now does and claims to have done all along)
leaves logically open to the interpreter the option of saying that certain other
interpretations—for example, Renehan' s interpretation (1) (in his earlier
article)—are simultaneously possible.
As to the first question: In his interpretation (2) (as quoted immediately
above and also as formulated in his first article) Renehan places his bets on
a dramatic change that he thinks will be brought about after the words
oXk.r\\ Tivd by "the unflattering word xdaKei": Up to the end of xivd the
audience will be supplying K6|ir|v; the rude word xdoKei, however, will
make them realize that d?i^riv xivd can "refer to a person." Is this
plausible? No, it is not.
For unless we are to imagine that the scene unfolds in a wig emporium,
the audience has thought of a person already if aXkr\v Tivd makes them
think of hair at all—because that is what hair comes attached to, persons.
What is left to make them think that this person is female rather than male
or vice versa? Only xdoKei, which contains nothing that can do this.
The argument from xdoKEi is unsatisfactory. But let us grant for the
sake of discussing my second question that xdoKEi could do what Renehan
claims: Where would that leave his interpretation (1) (as formulated at the
end of his first article, quoted above)? Can the poem be understood all the
way through in the straightforward, "heterosexual" way, or does xdoKei, as
Renehan now claims, trigger the "lesbian" interpretation? Does it, or
doesn't it?
Renehan evades this crucial question, and so a crucial fact fails to
emerge. Leaving aside Renehan' s ambiguous conclusion about which of
the two interpretations posed by him is the right one, an even deeper
ambiguity afflicts those two interpretations themselves: They actually
number three, and one of these three (the one he now says he preferred all
along) is incompatible with the other two.^
The three interpretations which Renehan presents as two are as follows:
(1) The poem proceeds on a single line of meaning: The clause eativ
ydp dn' eiL)Kx{xo\) AEa(3o\) indicates that the girl is, as Lesbian women are
generally reputed to be, beautiful, and so in a position to pick and choose;^
^ Renehan' s failure to acknowledge this fact renders his charge that I misrepresented his
argument meaningless: He misrepresented it himself.
* See Renehan (1993) 44, "... a region associated with beautiful women. Such a woman
might well assume a condescending air . . . She can do better," and (1984) 30, "the girl can
afford to pick and choose; she is beautiful." That he regards this point as important is shown
by his lengthy attempt to refute my arguments that there is no unambiguous evidence for a
Lesbian reputation for female beauty (Renehan [1993] 44 n. 7). Renehan basically charges that
my arguments are excessively logical; but such a criticism is self-refuting: Either my logic is
correct, in which case there is no evidence for a Lesbian reputation for beauty, or the claimed
evidence is such as not to admit the drawing of logical inferences from it, which is to say that
the evidence is ambiguous. See further note 20 below. Incidentally, one way of defending the
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KOHTiv is understood with a^A,riv xivd, and in the poem as a whole we have
nothing more than a lament that the girl rejects the speaker for another,
younger partner.'
(2a) Another line of meaning runs parallel to (1): "From Lesbos" can
also mean lesbian, and aA,^r|v Tivd can also mean "another girl." The
ambiguity is complete: Nothing in the poem causes the two lines to
intersect.
(2b) As in (2a) "from Lesbos" and akXT[v xivd are both ambiguous, but
xdoKei causes the two lines of meaning to intersect: The audience first
understands (1), but then xocokei directs them to re-interpret "from Lesbos"
and dX>.riv xivd as "lesbian" and "another girl," respectively, as per (2a).
Now if xdoKEi'^ does what Renehan says it does, then it renders (1)
and (2a) untenable. He presents (1) and (2b) as mutually compatible. But if
(1) can be sustained in the unqualified way he says it is, then (2b) is not the
case, and if (2b) can be sustained in the unqualified way he says it is, then
(1) is not the case. You cannot have both simultaneously, at least not
without appeal to some further hypothesis (such as that of different audience
perceptions, entertained below), an appeal Renehan nowhere makes."
use of//. 9. 129 f. to support the theory of a widespread Lesbian reputation for female beauty
that I have not seen attempted—a defense against my argument from the imperfect evlKCOv in 9.
130—would be to identify that imperfect as either a "timeless imperfect" (on which see West
on Hesiod, Th. 10 and H. Pelliccia, The Structure ofArchaic Greek Hymns [diss. Yale 1985] 12
f. and 64 f.) or a timeless present "focalized" (i.e., I would say, "attracted"—see Wackemagel
as cited in Pelliccia, Structure 64) to the temporal perspective of the events described (on
which theory see A. Rijksbaron, "Euripides Bacchae 35-36," Mnemosyne 48 [1995] 198-200).
^ This interpretation has been advocated by, among others, M. L. West, "Melica," CQ 20
(1970)209.
'° Or anything else. The important characteristic that distinguishes (2b) is the claim that
there is something in the text that directs the audience to look for the "lesbian" interpretation,
i.e. that causes the two lines of meaning to intersect.
'
' There is evidence that Renehan sensed the problem here: In both articles the
incompatibles are kept apart from one another. In the concluding paragraphs of his first article
(quoted above) this separation is achieved through two devices: (a) in presenting interpretation
(1) he suppresses the source of the incompatibility, viz. the earlier argument from xaoKEi
(which he now chides me for failing to report), and (b) after following interpretation (1) with
(2b), he immediately transforms (2b) into (2a), which is compatible with (1): "If the statement
that the girl is from Lesbos intimates that she is a lesbian—and that would not become apparent
(deliberately so) until the final verse [an oblique allusion to the now suppressed argument from
XaoKEi]—then o.'k'kr\\ refers to a woman." This is interpretation (2b), the interpretation he
now claims to have preferred all along. The immediately succeeding sentence effects the
transformation into (2a): "If this interpretation is correct, Aeo(3ox) and aA,^T|v are each
intentionally ambiguous: one should not then insist, with most scholars, that ak'kr\\ must refer
either to 'hair' or to 'a girl' to the exclusion of the other. It may refer, at different levels, to
both." (Emphasis in the original, and note the logic: If the "correct" interpretation is that
aXXriv refers to a woman, then a.Xkr\v refers to both hair and a woman.) Contributing also to
the evasion of these difficulties is the suppression of the earlier claim that the audience will
have made satisfactory sense of the clause eoxiv yap an euKxixo^) AeoPou as explaining the
girl's rejection of the speaker by telling us that she is beautiful and so in a position to pick and
choose (see above, note 8). Renehan suppresses this claim when he is desirous of advocating
the "lesbian" interpretation (2b). Thus in the concluding paragraphs of the first article (quoted
above), when he is about to say that the "lesbian" interpretation is possible, his previously
given interpretation of the clause (she is beautiful and can pick and choose) is watered down to
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Insofar as Renehan now advocates (2b), he would seem to be in
agreement with the position taken in my article about the structure of the
poem (i.e. that, as per [2b], the lines of meaning are made to intersect). But
where I argued that the anticipatory positioning of ecxiv yap an' evKxixov
AeaPov is what triggers the lesbian interpretation, Renehan assigns that task
to xcL<3yi£,\, which, as we have seen, however, cannot function in the way
Renehan wants it to. I turn now to my arguments about the anticipatory
ydp-clause.
In his recent article Renehan complains that I did not do justice to his
use of the parallel which he cited from Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 37-39:
6 yocp ocvrip, cb (piA-xdxri, / 'Laka\iivioq yo^P eoxiv w ^iJveiii' eyw, / xt^v vtjxQ'
6?iriv TiA,a\)ve |i' ev xoiq oxpa)|j.aoiv.^2 Certainly one of the reasons I wrote
my article was because I thought that there was more of interpretative value
to be extracted from this parallel than I thought Renehan had done; thus it
may be true that I underestimated his implicit suggestions. But it does
appear from his new article that our ideas about the parallel differ
considerably. I will quote from my earlier article the passages quoted by
Renehan himself:
The function ... of the interposed Y«P-clause . . . ("for he is from
Salamis") is perfectly clear: it provides the ethnic information that sets up
and makes possible the obscene punchline. . . The first ydp-clause in
Anacreon resembles that in Aristophanes in an even more significant way:
both interrupt their sentences in order to tell the ethnic origin of the
subject; in Aristophanes this ethnic information serves to set up the
obscene punchline that follows, and that is its only purpose. There is an
obvious point to be made from all this: an interposed or anticipatory ydp-
clause demands a "pay-off," comic or otherwise; when the interposed
clause contains ethnic information, the pay-off must present action
associated with the ethnic group. '^
Renehan represents my arguments as follows:
The reader will have observed that in the quotations from Pelliccia's paper
just given he refers twice to "the obscene punchline" in the Aristophanes
passage. The two passages from Anacreon and Aristophanes have in
common 1) a parenthetic ydp-clause and 2) an "ethnic" (perhaps better
"geographic") reference in this clause. Aristophanes also has 3) an
"a complimentary allusion to the girl's origins." In the second article he says, "as one goes
through the sentence, eotIv yap an' euktito^) AeoPou is first understood to refer to the girl's
illustrious homeland"—but what else could eoTiv an' euicTitou AeaPou possibly refer to?
Anyone who doubts that we are witnessing a hedging operation here should consider
Renehan's words in support of the "lesbian" interpretation in his next sentence: ". . . at which
point [xdoKei] one realizes that eotIv yap an' e\)ktitou AeoPou can admit of a quite different
(lesbian) meaning" (emphasis added)—"different" from what? Surely even with the "lesbian"
meaning the words still refer to her "illustrious homeland"?
'2 Renehan (1993) 41^3.
'3pelliccia(1991)31 f.
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obscene ending. While Pelliccia does not quite say so in so many words,
the reader naturally infers from his language that this is a third detail
which the two passages must share, because such a ydp-clause,
specifically containing an ethnic or geographic reference and leading up to
an obscene punchline, constitutes, as it were, a formal pattern. . .
Parenthetic yocp-clauses can be used for humorous effect and doubtless
often were. The interesting presence in them, on occasion, of an ethnic
word followed by an obscene ending does not prove that an obscene
ending must always, or even usually, follow. The formal structure
common to Anacreon 13 and Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 37-39 is neutral
in this regard. It was of set purpose that I did not draw any further
inferences along these lines. ^'^
Renehan here conjures up an obviously false claim that anticipatory ydp-
clauses containing ethnic information "must always, or usually" be followed
by "obscene punchlines," and then sets about refuting it. The general
principle that underlay my argument from the Aristophanes parallel was that
conformity to a clearly defined and rhetorically effective structure,
independently attested, can serve as a criterion for a correct reading.'^ In
describing the structure that I perceived to be shared by the two passages I
distinguished between "punchlines" and "pay-offs" as between sub-set
(jokes, including obscene jokes) and set: All anticipatory yap-clauses must
be followed by pay-offs, which is an analytic truth about "anticipatory ydp-
clauses": They "anticipate" something, which I call the "pay-off."'^ The
structure which raises and exploits expectation in this way is as I observed
"suitable" for the kind of sexual joke exemplified by the Aristophanes
passage and the Anacreon poem on the "lesbian" interpretation.'"' But "pay-
off was explicitly characterized as "comic or otherwise," and I illustrated
the "otherwise" with a passage from Herodotus in which an anticipatory
ethnic ydp-clause is followed by a non-humorous and non-obscene pay-off
exploiting the ethnic information earlier given, thus satisfying the
expectations raised by the use of the anticipatory positioning of the ydp-
clause containing it.'^
I conclude this section by stressing the point that the clause eoxiv ydp
an e\)KTiT0'u AeoPoi) cannot be demonstrated to have possessed any
'"Renehan (1993) 42 f.
'^ My wording here borrows from that of /C5's anonymous referee.
'^Pelliccia (1991) 32.
'^
Pelliccia (1991) 33 n. 8.
'* Pelliccia (1991) 32 n. 6. The presence of this example in my discussion makes clear the
illegitimacy of Renehan's assertion that I implicitly claimed "an obscene punchline" (or
"obscene ending") as a part of the structure described. Renehan complains ([1993] 41 f.) that
what is good in my arguments here is already present in his (though I concealed this truth by
misquoting his description of the Aristophanes passage as "an exactly parallel sentence-
structure" with "-structure" omitted); the rest is not to his liking. But it is clear from Renehan's
errors discussed above in the text, and from the wholly irrelevant parallel "ydp-clauses with an
ethnic or geographic element" which he cites ([1993] 43), that he has misunderstood the nature
and purpose of my terminology, and my arguments generally.
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connotations (e.g. of Lesbian beauty or Lesbian lesbianism) that will have
effectively guided the audience to an immediate understanding of what the
girl is about to be revealed to do or why she does it. I suggest that this
apparent defect is in fact a virtue—the virtue on which the poem's whole
effect depends. The hypothesis that the poet meant for the original audience
not to take any immediately exploitable information from the words coheres
with the larger one that the poem as a whole is a Tiapa 7ipoo5oK{av joke.
The clause's initial contribution is on this argument a function of its being
an anticipatory ydp-clause: The relevance (in the pragmatic sense)'^ of the
information it conveys (the girl's place of origin) is, by the convention of
this kind of clause, not perspicuous at the time it is communicated. But the
ordinary assumption between speaker and audience is that all information
conveyed is relevant: If, as with anticipatory yap-clauses, that relevance is
not evident when the information is first provided, we assume, and actively
expect, that it will emerge when the strands are tied together—at or no later
than the pay-off. In the case of Anacreon 13, this expectation is not
satisfied by the sentence relating the girl's rejection of the speaker (xt^v |iev
e|iTiv Koiiriv, / ^evKTi ydp, Kaxa|ie|i(pexai), and Anacreon ensures that it is
not by attaching to that clause its own explanation, independent of the girl's
place of origin: The speaker is old and has grey hair (^e-UKTi ydp). Since a
young girl does not have to be from Lesbos—on one of Renehan's
intermittently advocated arguments, beautiful and stylish, and so able to
pick and choose—to spurn the amatory advances of the elderly, so her
rejection of the speaker will not satisfy the expectations aroused in the
audience by the anticipatory eoxlv ydp an evKxixcu AeaPo-u.^^
'^ As discussed, e.g. by H. P. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge 1989) 28:
"Relation. I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at each
stage of the transaction. If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a
good book."
^° There is a secondary question here that enters into Renehan's complaints against me: Did
Lesbian women have a reputation for lesbianism in the time of Anacreon? The answer is
important for those who, like M. Marcovich ("Anacreon, 358 PMG," AJP 104 [1983] 372-83)
and me, want to find an overt reference to lesbianism in the poem. Obviously it is in
Marcovich' s and my interest if there exists relevant evidence outside of the poem itself.
Marcovich thought that the character and fame of Sappho's poetry constituted this external
evidence. I suggested (Pelliccia [1991] 33 n. 8) that, assuming the "lesbian" interpretation, the
poem would not succeed as a joke "if the equation" between Lesbos and lesbianism were "so
well established as to be automatic"—too much would be given away too soon: What is
needed for that interpretation is not the reputation for lesbianism, but a basis for such a
reputation, the raw materials out of which the malicious wit (Anacreon) can make the
reputation-creating joke. As Marcovich says, Sappho's poetry provides a basis for such.
Renehan complains ([1993] 45) that I misrepresented him by saying that he rejected arguments
like Marcovich's as circular. I leave it to the interested reader to examine his original
discussion in its entirety ([1984] 30) and to decide whether I misrepresented Renehan's
position, or he stated it in an unclear and self-contradictory way. The hard-to-support claim
that the clause eoxlv yap an euktitou AeoPou can refer to a Lesbian reputation for female
beauty (see above, note 8) raises another question: Both that interpretation and the one that has
the audience eventually realize that the reference of the anticipatory ydp-clause is to the
supposed lesbianism of Lesbian women involve assumptions difficult to different degrees; why
do I think the latter so much easier than the former? First, because it requires only a basis for a
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Renehan approaches the finish of his recent article with the following
statement: "The problem of conscious ambiguities is of no little importance
in poetry. Some twenty years ago the great American Pindaric scholar,
Elroy Bundy, wrote of 'ambiguity of this sort' as 'being one of the most
powerful instruments of meaning in poetry '."^^ If readers are conscious of a
failure to live up to Bundy' s pronouncement, they will find their sense of
inadequacy alleviated by the discovery in a footnote that Bundy committed
the quoted words to "an undated letter" to Renehan. ^^ Renehan'
s
presentation of this item from his personal correspondence leaves us with
the impression that Bundy, who died in 1975, somehow endorsed the
discovery of "ambiguity of this sort" in Anacreon 13 nine years later.^^ The
question of genuine interest raised and skirted here is how "conscious
ambiguity" is defined—for example, whose consciousness counts?
Renehan' s long concluding paragraph is devoted to demonstrating the
kinship of the ambiguity he now unambiguously discerns in Anacreon 1 3 to
that of Sophocles, OT 337 f., where Tiresias says to Oedipus, opyfiv
e|ie|i\|/co xfiv eiLiriv, xr\v ofiv 5' 6|iot) / vaioDoav o\) KaTei68(;, aXk' e|ie
yeyeic;.^'^ That the reference can be to anger or to Jocasta is obvious; but
precisely how is this relevant to Renehan' s now preferred (2b) interpretation
reputation rather than the reputation itself and, second, because stereotypes are very easily
formed on the basis of (alleged) behavioral characteristics, and very rarely (if ever) on the
basis of beauty. That is true about both ancient and modem ethnic stereotyping. For example,
in America, Califomian women have the greatest reputation for beauty, and there are jokes that
exploit this reputation. But in order for them to do so something in the context prior to the
punchline must guide the listener to the idea of beauty. If, however, a joke gives no such
guidance, but preposes the ethnic information (e.g. "I know this woman—she's from
California—and she . . ."), unusually high beauty is not what will be inferred from it, but
behavior associated with the group. (This is not to say that physical characteristics in general
are never inferred, because they are; my point has to do with the claim that high beauty is ever
generalized for entire ethnic groups or populations to the degree that mere mention of the
ethnic identity alone immediately connotes that the given individual representative is
"beautiful.") What is especially odd about the "beautiful Lesbians" interpretation of the ydp-
clause is its superfluousness: Tliat the girl is elegant (her sandals) and attractive (the speaker's
arousal) is already indicated in the first stanza; the yap-clause must be telling us something else
about her. As to the immediate effect of the clause when first heard (but before being
completed in the pay-off), I would say that the language (euKxixou especially) instead of being
meant to invoke a (not proven) Lesbian reputation for female beauty, is rather simply intended
to sound epic—reminiscent of the way characters in Homer are identified or identify
themselves upon first meeting others: "I hail from from horse-nurturing Argos" or the like. It
thus sets the girl up high for her impending fall.
2' Renehan (1993) 46.
22 Renehan (1993) 46 n. 9.
2^ Bundy's exoteric doctrine was somewhat different: "In general, common sense ought to
tell us that one thing cannot be another ... In the judgment of distinction of meaning . . . lies
the critic's task" (E. L. Bundy, "The 'Quarrel between Kallimachos and ApoUonios'," CSCA 5
[1972] 90 n. 111).
24 Renehan (1993) 46 f.
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of Anacreon 13, in which the last word of the speaker's utterance (xaoKei)
leads the hearers, according to Renehan, to the solution? Tiresias' retort
exemplifies the ambiguity of the seer or oracle, here adapted to the purposes
of "tragic" irony. The ambiguity is evident only to those who know what
the two possible meanings are (Tiresias and the theatrical audience), and is
not evident at all to the dramatic audience, including, especially, the
addressee, for whom the surface meaning satisfies all the pragmatic
requirements (i.e. there is nothing performing the function that Renehan
assigns to xocokei in Anacreon 13). By identifying Tiresias' ambiguity with
that of Anacreon 13, Renehan would appear once again to be abandoning
his (2b) interpretation of the latter in favor of (2a), whereby nothing overtly
points to the possibility of an alternative meaning.
Anacreon 13—on Renehan' s favored (2b) interpretation—seems to
work differently. What (2b) and its congeners assume is that there are
available to small-scaled, self-contained exercises other resources by means
of which to stimulate the audience to look for ambiguity:^^ Creating an
expectation that is not satisfied, at least not immediately on first hearing, is
one of them. The anticipatory positioning of eaxiv yap an e\)KTixo\)
AeaPot) in Anacreon 13 indicates that there is something to be looked for:
We accept on faith that such information is going to prove relevant, which
sets us to look for that relevance. If by the poem's end the audience has not
hit on something that makes use of the ethnic information, then the defeated
expectation itself will incite them to go back and search for a solution.
It is out of these facts that we might construct a good argument that
Anacreon 13 is ambiguous in something of the manner Renehan seems to
want. The way to do so would be to forget Renehan' s implausible argument
from xdoKei, accept my point that eaxlv yap o.n evKxixo'u AeoPou conveys
no immediately usable explanatory information, but only serves, by virtue
of its being preposed, to make the audience sense that something is up and
to expect a pay-off, and then just say, "Although this kind of thing cannot
be demonstrated with any formal argument, it makes a better poem if we
imagine the audience hearing the whole thing through, taking aXkx\\ to
refer to hair, and thinking at the end, 'Well . . . ? So what? So he's mad at
the girl—where' s the promised pay-off?,' and then imagine that, as they
recur to the unsatisfied promise of eoxiv yap dn' evKXixou AeaPou and the
bathetic flatness of the hair interpretation, it slowly dawns on them that
famous Sappho of Lesbos famously liked girls, and so dA,^riv here might be
^^ When I distinguish Anacreon 13 from, e.g. OT, as being "self-contained" I am thinking in
particular of the possibilities open to Anacreon in treating a trivial and unnoticed incident
involving two anonymous private individuals, as opposed to the possibilities—for tragic
ambiguities, e.g.—open to Sophocles in reworking a well-known legend about famous and
well-established mythical characters.
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a girl, and the first girl is identified as Lesbian in the sense of being 'like
Sappho' in that respect."'^^
This interpretation seems to me to be attractive, but it raises the
possibility that we might go further and posit different audience responses.
Everyone has observed that some people are very highly attuned to
witticisms and wit generally, while others are defective in this respect,
sometimes not understanding a joke even when it is explained to them.
Most people fall somewhere in between. In my earlier paper I pointed out
that what led Renehan (and others) to supply Koiiriv with aA,?iriv xivd was
the assumption that since ^ev has kojitiv, it was therefore to be supplied
with 5e also, and I cited passages illustrating how that kind of assumption
about |i£v and 5e could be defeated.^^ That evidence and argument were
meant to explain how an audience might as soon as they heard it take
a^A,riv xivot to refer to a girl; we can now add that the evidence might also
and perhaps more plausibly be taken as indicating how a less quick-witted
audience would understand the particles to work after they had gone back
and unravelled the joke, in the manner described in the last paragraph: On
the first, unsatisfying run-through they will supply "hair," on the second,
"girl."
^^
I will illustrate my point about the lack of immediate connotation in the ethnic ydp-clause
with an example drawn from the modem world. As I said in my earlier paper, for the purposes
of the joke it is necessary that the association of Lesbos with lesbianism must not be so well-
established that it would give the joke away before it was concluded. I want to point out now
that jokes can be constitutive of stereotypes that do not really exist before they make them
exist. As my example I choose a scene from Woody Allen's film version of Everything You
Ever Wanted to Know about Sex. As I recall it, in the last skit of that movie we find ourselves
present in the brain of a would-be male seducer out on a date with a young woman. The brain
is depicted as a kind of NASA control center, with "scientists" walking around in white lab
coats in front of various computers and things. They see their present job to be to assist with
the seduction of the dinner companion, and they discuss whether or not the "mission" will be a
success. An older scientist then says to a younger, "Have you taken a look at her?," and they
move to some sort of viewing scope that lets them see across the dinner table to the woman,
who at that moment says, "I'm a graduate of New York University." The scientists
immediately laugh with pleasure, make the "thumbs up," and give other indications that this
information suggests that the seduction is a done deal. The audience in the theater where I saw
the movie in the early 70s found this joke on NYU women students immensely funny. This
was in Berkeley, and I would imagine that most members of the audience, like me, came to the
movie with absolutely no preconceptions along these lines about NYU students. I do not know
to this day if the stereotype had any existence prior to this movie, or after it, and it does not
matter if it had not: For those of us who had never heard of it, the joke simultaneously created
and exploited the stereotype, and the stereotype did not survive after the joke was over. In
other words, when the woman said the words "I'm a graduate of New York University" they
had no connotation to us in the audience; but when the scientists reacted in the way they did,
and did so in the context to which we were privy, we were able to supply her words
retrospectively with the necessary connotation. In this case the joke created a stereotype by
giving concrete (and ephemeral) expression to pre-existing general prejudices that large cities
are home to sexual promiscuity, and a 1950s-era notion of a kind not uncommon in Allen's
films that women who go to college are likely to be "fast" or "easy." Similarly, Anacreon's
poem may have opportunistically put together an idea of general Lesbian lesbianism on the
basis of Sappho's poetry.
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Three possible audiences correspond to the three character types
described:
(A) The ready wit—in particular, the familiar sub-type who sees
references to sex everywhere:^^ A hits on the joke as soon as the words
a?i^riv xivd are pronounced.
(B) The majority: They do not see the joke so quickly as A does, but
stimulated by the anticipatory ydp-clause (as described above) they go back
over the poem until they hit upon the solution.
(C) The obtusely humorless: Insensitive to the implications of the
anticipatory yotp-clause, C takes the poem as in interpretation (1) above (a
simple lament that the girl prefers a younger partner); C cannot understand
what everyone is laughing about (or, today, expressing indignation about).
B is the ideal audience, the mentality to which the composition has
been geared (A might see the point even too quickly). C should not be
disqualified from the discussion on the grounds that he or she misinterprets
or fails to interpret. Before an audience comprising A, B, and C, the poet
might derive the highest gratification from C.
Cornell University
^^ Many today who have not earned membership in this category are assimilated into it by
the historical accident that "from Lesbos" has implications or associations that would not have
been automatic at the time of the poem's composition.
